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COMMENT
PREGNANCY AND PARENTAL CARE POLICIES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: WHAT DO
THEY TELL US ABOUT
UNDERLYING SOCIETAL VALUES?
Anne Lofasot
Reaction to Felice Schwartz' article, "Management Women and the
New Facts of Life," 1 has added a new question to the already heated
debate surrounding issues of gender discrimination: to what extent are
current pregnancy and parental care policies instruments of discrimina-
tion? This paper will explore this question by focusing on the extent to
which pregnancy and parental care laws and policies in the United States
and the European Community help to subordinate those women who
take advantage of maternity "benefits" as well as the class of women in
general.
An examination of pregnancy and parental care leave is a legitimate
and useful inquiry for understanding and comparing implicit societal val-
ues. This issue provides a natural forum for cross-cultural comparison
because all industrialized societies must struggle with the question of
how to deal with pregnant working women. Furthermore, this issue
raises the more interesting question of whether and to what extent deeply
rooted prejudices cloud important social issues and skew scientific inter-
pretations of statistics. To what extent do these prejudices disable social
scientists who use their tools to forecast and then prove politically desira-
t A.B. 1987, Harvard University; J.D. 1991, University of Pennsylvania. I would
like to thank Dr. Janice Bellace, Professor Friedrick Kubler, Dr. Anita Summers, Profes-
sor Clyde W. Summers, Professor Manfred Weiss, Sydney Coutts, Larry Frankel, and
Frangois-Ihor Mazur. I would also like to thank Stephen J. McDonough for providing
much-needed support. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Helen and Joseph
Lofaso, who raised six children of their own without the benefit of this work.
1. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, 67 HARV. Bus. REV. 65 (1989).
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ble and undesirable predictions? Pregnancy and parental care policies
are also interesting because they involve an area that must divide along
gender lines (even where paternity leave is available). After all, only wo-
men can give birth to and breast-feed children. Historically, this biologi-
cal difference has been used as a scientific cloak by those in power who
wished to disenfranchise women. The question remains: to what degree
do current maternity laws remedy this historical discrimination? After
analyzing the ways in which various cultures deal with working women,
comparative analysis helps to direct us to and focus our attention upon
the values underlying common perceptions regarding gender.
Section I of this paper provides the sociological background neces-
sary for an informed discussion of pregnancy and parental care policies
across the United States. Section II describes the ways in which the
United States has organized its maternity leave system at the legal level
and critically analyzes the American maternity leave system from a femi-
nist perspective. Section III describes countervailing European models
within the European Economic Community and compares these models
with the American model. Finally, sections IV and V offer an alternative
solution to the problem that arises when maternity policies serve, to some
extent, as instruments of discrimination. What values, if any, do such
policies reflect? What values do we, as a society, want these policies to
reflect?
I. BACKGROUND
In traditional Western society, men have worked outside the home
and women have worked in the home.2 It was not until 1910 that more
than one-fifth of the female population worked outside the home. Most
of these women were single or widowed.' The common wisdom used to
rationalize this phenomenon was that the unpaid tasks of motherhood
and housewifery were a woman's occupation and that outside, paid em-
ployment was a man's occupation.4 Presently, women constitute forty-
four percent of the United States' nondomestic civilian labor force.5
2. See infra note 6 and accompanying Table 1.
3. Newman, Working for Wages, in MEN'S IDEAS/WOMEN'S REALITIES 244 (L. Newman ed.
1985) [hereinafter Newman]. Newman takes her statistics from the United States Census Bureau.
She notes that early statistics regarding women in the work force are often misleading for four major
reasons: (1) investigators often neglected to inquire about the employment status of the wives of
working men; (2) full-time housewives often neglected to report outside employment because of the
social stigma attached to working women; (3) many women do "work" around the house-"labor
that is not accounted for in the Census statistics;" (4) the Census did not account for women "per-
forming unpaid work in the home until 1930, when a new category. 'home-maker' was added." Id.
at 256, n.l. See also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 209 (1987) [hereinafter ECON. REP.
1987].
4. See generally Newman, supra note 3.
5. ECON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 209.
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Although women currently comprise a relatively large portion of the la-
bor market, this phenomenon is a recent occurrence. The following
chart compares the total percentage of the employed male population
with the total percentage of the employed female population between
1880 and 1920:6
TABLE 1. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES, 1880-1920
Year Total Employed Men Total Women Women
Population Employed Women Employed Employed
(%) (#) (#) (%)
1880 17,391 78.7 18,025 2,647 14.7
1890 23,337 79.3 23,060 4,005 17.4
1900 29,072 80.0 28,246 5,319 18.8
1910 38,166 81.3 34,552 8,075 23.4
1920 41,613 78.2 40,449 8,549 21.2
Women were traditionally locked out of the labor market for a
number of reasons. Whereas physical differences may have accounted
for some economically rational gender discrimination in the labor mar-
ket, historically, gender discrimination also had an irrational and eco-
nomically deleterious component.7 Gender discrimination in the labor
market has had at least as much to do with sociological, social, and non-
physical differences between the sexes as with economically rational mo-
tives on the part of the employer.8
Women began to enter the civilian work force in the first half of the
twentieth century, although the pace of entry accelerated after World
War I1.9 The postwar acceleration is attributable to the alleviation of
many traditional barriers blocking greater female participation. A reduc-
tion in the time required for household management combined with a
decrease in birth rate, an increase in educational opportunities, and rising
wages made it economically advantageous for women to work outside
the home. Women thus shifted their productive activities from the home
to the marketplace.10 Interestingly, participation rates among married
women continued to rise in the 1950s and 1960s and then again in the
1980s, at a time when real earnings of both men and women rose
implying that family standards of living would have risen even without
the earnings of the wife. Thus, while higher real incomes for male
wage earners meant less financial need for their wives to work, the
6. Numbers are in the thousands. Newman, supra note 3, at 251 (citing WOMEN'S BUREAU
BULLETIN No. 46, FACTS AaOUT WORKING WOMEN (1925)).
7. See generally Newman, supra note 3.
8. See infra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
9. ECON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 209.
10. Id. at 209-10.
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attraction of higher wages and less need for women to work at home
drew women into the labor market." 1
Economic hardships of the 1970s temporarily diminished this trend, but
many women were forced to remain in the work force to maintain previ-
ously attained standards of living. 2
Women presently comprise forty-four percent of the work force.' 3
Table 2A demonstrates the foregoing historical trends in female labor
force participation rates; Table 2B contains civilian labor force and par-
ticipation rates comparing the two genders:
TABLE 2A. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN, BY
AGE, 1890-1986'
4
YEAR WOMEN AGES 20 -64 ALL WOMEN
All White Minority 20-24 25-34
1890 ......... 17.4 14.9 38.4 30.2 16.8
1900 ......... 19.3 16.5 41.0 31.7 19.4
1920 ......... 22.9 20.7 43.1 37.5 23.7
1930 ......... 25.4 23.3 44.1 41.8 27.1
1940 ......... 29.4 27.9 42.9 45.6 33.3
1950 ......... 33.3 32.2 43.2 43.6 32.0
1960 ......... 42.3 40.9 54.0 46.1 36.0
1970 ......... 50.0 49.1 57.2 57.7 45.0
1980 ......... 60.8 60.5 62.8 68.9 65.5
1986 ......... 66.4 66.3 66.4 72.4 71.6
11. Id. at 210.
12. Id. Of course, as data from the 1950s and 1960s seems to indicate, women remained in the
work force, in part, independent of economic factors. Thus, when economic realities made dual
income necessary to maintain accustomed standard of living, both economic and noneconomic
forces compelled women to remain in the work force.
13. See EcON. REP. 1987, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. EcON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 211 (citing G. BANCROFT, THE AMERICAN LABOR
FORCE (1958) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS monograph data from 1890-1950) and BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (data from 1960-86)). According to the Report, "[t]here
is some controversy over the Census counts of women workers in the 1890-1940 time period." Id. at
211.
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TABLE 2B. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND PARTICIPATION RATES, BY
GENDER AND AGE, 1970 TO 1987, AND PROJECTIONS" s





Sex/Age 1970 1980 1987 1995 2000 1970 1980 1987 1995 2000
Male 51.2 61.5 66.2 70.4 73.1 79.7 77.4 76.2 75.3 74.7
16-19 4.0 5.0 4.1 4.0 4.5 56.1 60.5 56.1 58.5 60.2
20-24 5.7 8.6 7.8 6.9 7.0 83.3 85.9 85.2 86.8 87.5
25-34 11.3 17.0 19.7 18.4 16.6 96.4 95.2 94.6 93.9 93.6
35-44 10.5 11.8 15.6 19.4 20.1 96.9 95.5 94.6 94.1 93.9
45-54 10.4 9.9 10.2 13.7 16.3 94.3 91.2 90.7 90.6 90.1
55-64 7.1 7.2 6.9 6.4 7.2 83.0 72.1 67.6 64.0 63.2
65 + 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.4 26.8 19.0 16.3 11.9 9.9
Female 31.5 45.5 53.7 61.2 65.6 43.3 51.5 56.0 59.8 61.5
16-19 3.2 4.4 3.9 3.8 4.4 44.0 52.9 53.3 57.2 59.2
20-24 4.9 7.3 7.1 6.5 6.7 57.7 68.9 73.0 76.4 78.4
25-34 5.7 12.3 15.6 16.0 15.1 45.0 65.5 72.4 79.2 82.3
35-44 6.0 8.6 12.9 17.1 18.4 51.1 65.5 74.5 81.0 84.2
45-54 6.5 7.0 8.0 11.6 14.2 54.4 59.9 67.1 72.7 75.4
55-64 4.2 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.7 43.0 41.3 42.7 44.3 45.8
65 + 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 9.7 8.1 7.4 6.2 5.4
Table 3 demonstrates the
force participation rates:
effect of childbirth and childrearing on labor
TABLE 3. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN BY AGE OF
YOUNGEST CHILD, MARCH OF SELECTED YEARS, 1970-8616
(%)
Wives, Husband Present Women
Families Alone
Presence and Age of child years 1970 1975 1980 1986 1986
Total ....................... 40.8 44.5 50.2 54.6 62.1
With children
Under 18 ................. 39.8 44.9 54.3 61.4 69.5
Under 6 .................. 30.3 36.8 45.3 53.9 57.9
Under 3 .................. 25.8 32.6 41.5 51.0 50.9
Under 1 .................. 24.0 30.8 39.0 49.8 44.7
3 - 5 ..................... 36.9 42.2 51.7 58.5 64.5
6- 17 .................... 49.2 52.4 62.0 68.5 76.8
6 - 13 .................... 47.0 51.8 62.6 68.0 74.5
For the most part, low female participation rates during the first
15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 376 (1989).
16. ECON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 211 (quoting BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR).
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year after childbirth are directly attributable to childbirth (i.e., hospitali-
zation, medical care, postnatal recovery, etc.). Additionally, the parental
decision to breast-feed the child may help to sustain low female participa-
tion rates during the first year after childbirth. In contrast, women who
stay out of the labor force for more than two years are probably the
parent primarily responsible for childrearing. 17 Interestingly, single
mothers stay out of the work force in larger numbers than married
mothers during the first two years after childbirth. By the time the
youngest child is two years old, the single mother and the married
mother return to the work force in approximately equal numbers.
Whereas single mothers return to the work force in increasingly greater
numbers as their youngest child grows older, married women return to
the work force at a slower pace.
TABLE 4. FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME RATES OF WORKING MOTHERS
(Winter 1984-85. Number in Thousands) 8
Children under 5 Children 5-14
Marital Status Total F-t P-t Total F-t P-t
Husband Present 6,637 4,051 2,586 14,202 8,424 5,778
Not Present 1,531 1,009 522 4,085 3,328 757
In short, the foregoing factors that decrease female participation
rate--childbirth, breast-feeding and childrearing-should all be kept sep-
arate in any analysis of maternity policies. Moreover, a complete analy-
sis must examine marital status with a recognition of two conflicting
realities that tend to force women into and out of the work force: the
ability to find alternate child care arrangements and the economic need
to provide for the child. In the case of the single mother, because she can
look only to herself as a source of income to support her child, she must
work. However, she may have no one to care for her child precisely
because she is single. In contrast, although the married woman has a
husband who could alternatively care for the child, she also has a hus-
band as a source of income. Thus, the married woman is often able to
reenter the work force at an earlier stage than the single woman, but may
choose either to remain at home or to continue to work on a part-time
basis. The single woman, however, is forced to reenter the work force on
a full-time basis without regard to personal choice. She must find alter-
native child care arrangements so she can work to support her child, or
17. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying Table 3.
18. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS?
CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS: WINTER 1984-85, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, SERIES P-70,
No. 9, at 13 (1987) [hereinafter WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS?]
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she must be supported publicly by welfare, for example. 9
Since 1979, more women than men have graduated from college.2°
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate this historical trend over the last thirty years:
TABLE 5. COLLEGE ENROLLMENT AND PERCENT OF HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATES ENROLLED IN, OR COMPLETED ONE OR MORE
YEARS OF COLLEGE, BY SEX: 1960 TO 1986




Year All Persons Male Female
1960 .............. 2,279 1,365 914
1970 .............. 6,065 3,461 2,604
1980 .............. 7,475 3,700 3,778
1985 .............. 7,799 3,880 3,917
1986 .............. 7,613 3,739 3,874
High school Graduates
Enrolled (%)
All Persons Male Female
1960 .............. 23.8 30.4 18.0
1970 .............. 33.3 41.8 26.3
1980 .............. 32.3 33.8 30.9
1985 .............. 34.3 36.0 32.8
1986 .............. 34.4 35.7 33.3
H.S. Graduates Enrolled in College or Completed One or More Years of College (%)
All Persons Male Female
1960 .............. 40.4 46.1 35.3
1970 .............. 52.3 59.2 46.5
1980 .............. 51.1 51.4 51.0
1985 .............. 54.3 54.6 54.0
1986 .............. 54.8 54.2 55.3
19. See also infra note 26 and accompanying Table 7.
20. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS, annual; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, SERIES P-20, No. 429 (1986).
21. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 147.
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TABLE 6. COLLEGE ENROLLMENT, By GENDER
(Degree Credit Enrollment Only)
Year All Persons Male Female
1972 ......... 9,095 5,218 3,877
1975 ......... 10,880 5,911 4,969
1978 ......... 11,140 5,581 5,559
1979 ......... 11,380 5,480 5,900
1980 ......... 11,387 5,430 5,957
1982 ......... 12,309 5,899 6,410
1983 ......... 12,320 6,010 6,310
1984 ......... 12,304 5,989 6,317
1985 ......... 12,524 5,905 6,616
1986 ......... 12,402 5,848 6,554
Labor-saving devices continue to lessen the time necessary for
household management, and birth rates remain comparatively low.
2 2
Women are a productive, significant, and necessary part of our present-
day work force. Although women are attending college and entering the
work force, inequities remain, in part because the assimilation of women
into the work force is not complete. Current inequities go well beyond
that which can be accounted for by physical differences between the gen-
ders and the economically rational discrimination (i.e., egress from the
labor market on account of childbirth) that stems from these differences.
Past attitudes continue to play a role in gender discrimination,
although not to the same extent or in the same form as fifty years ago.2 3
In the past, employers established barriers to entry based on stereotypic
beliefs of what constitutes the woman's role in society. These beliefs en-
compassed the view that a woman's proper place was in the home and
that the employer should discriminate on that basis.24 Presently, dis-
22. ECON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 209-10.
23. See supra note 21.
24. For example, these attitudes contributed to societal barriers to aspiring professional women
under the guise of scientific truth. One such "scientific" theory declared that if a woman exerted too
much energy on intellectual matters, she would divert energy from her reproductive organs. Be-
cause this energy was necessary to have a child, society prevented many women from even consider-
ing a career. Even if a woman were not daunted by such "scientific truths," she was often prevented
from entering a professional career because of barriers to entry into all male schools, colleges, and
graduate programs. Barriers to entry into education have remained a great obstacle to entry into
certain "male-dominated" professions such as medicine, law, and business. See e.g., Bradwell v.
Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 (1872). In that case, the Supreme Court, in sustaining a law denying the right
to practice law to women, wrote:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say
identity, of interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of
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crimination is more likely to be based on statistically and economically
rational decisions; women take time off to have and raise children more
often than do men.25 Vestigial attitudes and economic factors, as well as
personal preferences, encourage mothers to choose to stay home with
children more often than do fathers, or in lieu of alternatives such as
nannies or day care. Even if the mother chooses to work, the father gen-
erally is not the primary caretaker; in fact, the working mother often
remains the primary caretaker, but makes arrangements for alternative
child care while she is at work:
TABLE 7. PRIMARY CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN
UNDER 15 WITH WORKING MOTHERS
(Winter 1984-85)26
Type of child care arrangement Children under 5 Children 5 - 14 years
By father 18.8 8.4
By grandparent 13.9 2.5
By other relative 6.7 2.4
By nonrelative 28.3 3.0
Day care center 12.7 1.6
Nursery school 9.6 1.2
Grade school 0.8 75.1
Cares for self - 2.3
Once the child reaches school age, the working mother uses grade school
as her primary form of child care arrangement.
Because the woman's perceived and actual role in society is that of
primary caretaker, it is often economically advantageous for employers
generally to employ men. 27 Furthermore, whereas employers often grant
some form of maternity leave (varying from a few weeks unpaid leave to
several months paid leave),28 employers have yet to deal effectively with
her husband. [The] paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J. concurring).
25. See supra notes 16 and 17 and accompanying Tables 3 and 4.
26. WHO's MINDING THE KIDS?, supra note 18, Table 1 at 13. Note that this is a modified
abstract.
27. In some jobs, there may be no economic advantage to favor men over women. For exam-
ple, there may be no economic advantage in favoring a male nurse on night shifts, or a job during the
school day hours, or any job that can be executed at home.
28. For a summary of state maternity leave laws, see Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Differ-
ences into Account, 54 FORD. L. REV. 699, 720-731 (1986). Dowd indicates that five states (Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wisconsin) and Puerto Rico guarantee maternity
leave by statute (citing California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§ 12945(b)(2) (West 1988); Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
60(a)(7) (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1985); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 467 (1985); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 11 1.36(1) (West Supp. 1985)). Other states guarantee maternity leave for state employees or
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the issue of paternity leave. Employers who do grant paternity leave may
find that few fathers take advantage of this benefit, in part because of
lingering stereotypic stigmatization. In effect, the employment policy of
maternity leave can serve to compound the problem. First, it encourages
married women to leave the work force. Second, by imposing costs di-
rectly attributable to maternity leave on the employer, it encourages em-
ployers to favor men in the initial stages of the hiring process because the
employer believes that women are a "bad investment." Third, these poli-
cies do not effectively deal with issues of paternity leave (a question of
individual choice) or alternative child care (a question of equitable and
efficient distribution of the burden of child care). Thus, the burden of
child care remains on the mother rather than on one better able to bear
the burden: the employer or society.
There is economically rational discrimination. However, even if
such discrimination is economically rational in the short run for individ-
ual employers, it is often economically irrational in the long run both for
employers and for society as a whole.29 With respect to educated women
who can "afford" to stay home or who choose to leave the work force for
lack of a better alternative, fewer of these women are employed in higher
management positions and more of these women remain at home. Fur-
thermore, there are fewer qualified women in the work force in general,
and many of those women who are in the work force are overqualified,
employed in jobs that do not fully utilize their skills. On the other end of
the spectrum, current maternity policies and alternative child care facili-
ties are inadequate to meet the needs of single, less-educated mothers
who are forced to work out of necessity. Although these women are
often protected by statutes or employer practices permitting maternity
leave, they must reenter the labor force as soon as possible in order to
support their child. Yet, because there are neither adequate nor afforda-
ble alternatives to child care, these women are forced into certain kinds
of jobs. They may have to work part-time and ask a neighbor to care for
their child, or they may have to find a low-paying job in which they can
bring their child to the workplace.
In effect, because women are bearing the cost of child care, women
must make career choices, partially based on expectations of future fam-
ily disruptions. Thus, "[w]omen who plan continuous careers are more
likely to choose apprenticeship training or make specific investments in
for teachers. Id. at 720 n.93 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.225(b)(4) (1984) (granting up to nine
weeks leave); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-852 (1982) (granting school teachers up to one year's leave);
N.Y: Civ. SERV. LAW RULES & REGS. § 22. l(a) (McKinney 1983) (granting civil service employees
up to two years unpaid leave)). Other states guarantee maternity leave by regulations. Id. at 731
n.144 (citing Hawaii, Administrative Rules on Sex Discrimination, § 12-23-58 (1983)).
29. See infra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
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schooling as preparation for a particular occupation."3° Contrariwise,
women who plan for a family, compromise career plans or search for a
job with a flexible schedule. These choices may lead to the decision to
invest more heavily in the husband's career. "[I]f the wife chooses to
work, she must find employment wherever the family locates and is thus
less likely to acquire job-specific or nontransferable skills." 31 Similarly,
jobs that require "knowledge of a rapidly changing body of information,"
as is often the case with the professions, are not a good choice for the
women who plans career interruptions on account of child care responsi-
bilities.32 These considerations lead to several common job characteris-
tics valued by working women with children: schedule flexibility, shorter
working hours, longer holidays, school-like schedules, and jobs which do
not require much continuing education. Thus, women have often fa-
vored teaching, clerical positions, and part-time work.33
The following table demonstrates occupational choices among
women:
30. EcON. REP. 1987, supra note 3, at 217.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id.
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TABLE 8. PERCENT FEMALE IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, 1970,
1980, AND 198614
(Female Workers as Percent of Total Workers)
Occupation 1970 1980 1986
All Under 35
% Female Employment ........ 38 43 44 45
Managerial/Professional ........ 34 41 43 49
Math/Computers ............ 17 26 36 41
Physicians .................. 10 13 18 N/A
Registered Nurses ........... 97 96 94 N/A
Lawyers/Judges ............. 5 14 18 29
Technical, Sales and
Administrative Support ....... 59 64 65 66
Technicians ............... 34 44 47 48
Engineering ............... 9 17 18 22
Sales ..................... 41 49 48 54
Clerical support ........... 73 77 80 80
Secretaries ................ 97 98 98 98
Service Occupations ............ 60 59 61 58
Law enforcement ............ 6 13 14 N/A
Bartenders .................. 21 44 49 N/A
Waitresses .................. 91 88 85 N/A
Precision, Craft, Repair ......... 7 8 9 8
Operators, Laborers ............ 26 27 25 22
Motor vehicle operators ...... 5 9 11 10
Bus drivers ................. 28 49 50 N/A
Printing machine operators ... 14 27 28 N/A
Farming, Forestry, Fishing 9 15 16 14
This pattern raises two issues of equity: do current maternity poli-
cies encourage discrimination against women? What values underlie
these policies? In order to answer the first question, one must initially
determine what is meant by discrimination in the context of the working
mother. To discriminate is to make arbitrary distinctions in the treat-
ment of individuals.35 In this case, discrimination takes on many mean-
34. Id. Table 7-4.
35. Scholars define discrimination in several ways. To discriminate is also to treat an individual
less favorably than a similarly situated individual. This definition is not very useful in the context of
the pregnant woman for, after all, it is difficult to define just who is similarly situated to a pregnant
woman. Some state laws use similarly situated disabled persons as their standard. This standard
characterizes a natural female condition, childbirth, as a disability. This standard leads to stigmati-
zation of the pregnant working woman and therefore it is an undesireable standard and is, in and of
itself, an invidious form of discrimination. If to discriminate is to neglect to respect individual differ-
ences, then to label a pregnant working woman "disabled" is to rationalize and legitimize feminine
weakness.
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ings. First, career primary women 36 may suffer from the economically
rational, statistical discrimination by employers who not only discrimi-
nate against career secondary17 and family primary women but also
against women in general because of stereotypic reasoning. In other
words, career primary women are treated less favorably than career men
because the rational employer believes that the woman is likely to have
more career disruptions than the man. Thus, career primary women suf-
fer because they do not contribute to the statistical factors that compel
rational employers to discriminate. Second, because women bear the
cost of child care, women who want both a career and children suffer as
well due to rational discrimination against them. These women are
forced to choose between career and family. If they choose family, they
encourage their employer to continue to treat them less favorably be-
cause, from the employer's point of view, the working mother is less
dedicated to work outside the home and is therefore a less valuable em-
ployee. Thus, although women are becoming increasingly more edu-
cated, their skills are not being fully utilized. Moreover, some are
choosing not to invest in their own personal capital because such an in-
vestment has a low return during the childbearing years.
Current maternity policies encourage inequities as well as market
inefficiencies and failures. The degree to which such laws and policies
discriminate varies from culture to culture and even from state to state.
Thus, an examination of labor markets across different cultures both
sheds light on the extent to which current maternity policies permanently
subordinate female participation in the labor market and reveals underly-
ing societal values. The remainder of this paper focuses on a comparison
between the American and European labor markets in an attempt to re-
solve the problems presented by current maternity leave laws and policies
in a manner that is favorable from the standpoints of efficiency and eq-
uity and that also maximizes individual choice.
II. FEMINIST POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING PREGNANCY
AND PARENTAL CARE LAWS
Examination of maternity and parental care laws in the United
States and the European Community shows that underlying such laws
are several competing approaches to the problems of childrearing. One
approach, labelled the "strict equality" theory, assumes that there are no
significant differences between men and women. Advocates of this posi-
36. Career primary women are women who place career above a family. These women may
have a family but are not the primary caretaker and do not make career sacrifices for their families.
37. Career secondary women may have an excellent career, but are willing to make career
sacrifices for the sake of their family.
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tion argue that men and women ought to be treated equally ("the same")
in all respects. These advocates promote treating pregnancy leave like
any other illness or disability.3" A second approach, termed the "special
woman" theory, assumes that women are significantly different from men
and concludes, therefore, that women ought to receive special treatment
and protection.39 According to this approach, the legislature ought to
discriminate in favor of women' in those circumstances where women
are fulfilling their role as a woman. The rationale behind this approach is
that women are both the weaker and the more special sex and that, there-
fore, the law ought to take care of and protect them and their special
childbearing capabilities. A third approach, the "equality of difference"
theory, agrees with the special woman theory that differences between
the sexes exist. However, advocates of this position tend to disagree with
the legislative solution that the special woman theory advocates. Instead,
they argue that because differences exist between women and men, some
allowances ought to be made to accommodate these differences. Thus,
women are entitled to paid pregnancy leave without granting similar
leave to men. However, under such a scheme, either a man or a woman
would be permitted to take paid parental care leave.
This examination of pregnancy and parental care policies shows that
there is a mixture of approaches in the United States and Europe,
although the dominant approach in the United States appears to be the
strict equality theory. There appears to be greater recognition of differ-
ence in Western Europe with strands of the special woman theory, espe-
cially in the more socialist states of Western and Eastern Europe.
A. Summary and History of American Pregnancy and Parental Care
Laws
Maternity policies are legislated by the states in compliance with
applicable federal law-in particular, the United States Constitution, Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)4 1 and the Pregnancy
38. Advocates of this position assume that pregnancy is either an illness or a disability. This
position stereotypes women. If only women can give birth and if childbirth is an illness or a disabil-
ity, then one natural attribute of being a woman is an illness or a disability. Rather than recognizing
and celebrating the procreative essence of womanhood, those who attempt to hide this special differ-
ence between men and women serve only to reinforce social inequality through negative stereotyp-
ing. See infra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Comment, Women in Poland's Workforce: Why Less Than Equal is Good Enough,
11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 91 (1989) (authored by Christine Czarnecki).
40. Although advocates of this position claim to discriminate "in favor" of women, protective
legislation serves to discriminate "against" women and in favor of protecting the women's childbear-
ing capabilities. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter Title VII]. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 is divided into several subtitles. Title VII, which is applicable to discrimination, mandates,
inter alia, equal access to the labor market for women. For simplicity's sake, I will follow the com-
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Discrimination Act (PDA).42 Prior to 1964, American courts applied
the powers inherent under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution to strike down discriminatory practices.43 Since 1964, when
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act through the authority granted to
it under the fourteenth amendment, the courts stopped applying the
commerce clause in discrimination cases and began to apply a strict four-
teenth amendment analysis using the equal protection clause.'
Even with Title VII protection, there remained extensive evidence of
discrimination against pregnant working women prior to the enactment
of the PDA. 4' The courts involved in early Title VII cases generally held
mon practice of referring to the section number of the specific subtitle rather than using the cumber-
some numbering system of the United States Code which subdivides Title VII into sections 2000e-I
to 2000e-17. The corresponding sections of the Act are sections 701 through 718. Section 703(a)
states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, 92 Stat.
2076 (1978) [hereinafter PDA]. The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women af-
fected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and
nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This
subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for an abor-
tion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, that
nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise
affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis in the original).
43. Congress may regulate private discrimination pursuant to powers granted to it under the
commerce clause: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (both upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 using a
commerce clause analysis).
44. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("There can be no doubt that restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause."); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a criminal statute
prohibiting the cohabitation of interracial couples). Equal protection analysis invalidating gender
discrimination came later. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma
state law prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to males ages 18-20). The equal protection analysis to
invalidate gender discrimination did so under a strict equality theory of the sexes.
45. See California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 n.18 (1987) [hereinafter
Guerra] (citing Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-32 (1977) (statement
of Ethel Bent Walsh, Vice-Chairman, EEOC); id., at 113-117 (statement of Wendy W. Williams);
id., at 307-3 10 (statement of Bella S. Abzug); Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis
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that pregnancy classifications were not gender-based classifications, but
were rational distinctions between pregnant and nonpregnant persons.
Therefore, such classifications did not discriminate between males and
females and did not violate Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination."
Early cases upheld the constitutionality of benefit schemes that dis-
criminated against pregnant working women because they did not recog-
nize the special differences between men and women. Thus, although
employers may have been correct in not viewing pregnancy as a disabil-
ity, by having disability allowances for both men and women, but not
allowing pregnant women to take advantage of such allowances, employ-
ers were neglecting to account for gender differences. The courts began
to understand this problem in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,47 where the
Supreme Court held that if special provisions for pregnant working wo-
men were going to be established, the employer could not make preg-
nancy leave a less desirable choice than disability leave. The
predominant underlying assumption in the Court's analysis remains a
strict equality approach to solving the problem of gender discrimination
rather than an equality of respect for gender differences.
The PDA legislatively overrules all of these cases. Congress' stated
intent in enacting this amendment was to prohibit sex discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy.48 Although it is not completely clear from the
congressional record, it appears that what Congress meant in enacting
the PDA to combat discrimination of pregnant working women was: (1)
to recognize that a distinction between pregnant workers and non-
pregnant workers is not rational but rather neglects those special differ-
of Pregnancy, Hearings on HR 5055 and HR 6075 before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportuni-
ties of House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
46. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (upholding an employer-
sponsored, private disability plan excluding pregnant women from coverage); Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974) (excluding maternity leave from a California disability insurance system does
not constitute invidious discrimination or violation of equal protection). But see Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (holding that a statute requiring pregnant employees to take
pregnancy leave instead of sick leave and thereby losing their accumulated seniority is a violation of
Title VII because the statute "not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and
do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer.").
47. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
48. See Guerra at 286 n. 19 (citing 123 CONG. REC. 8144 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (legisla-
tion "will end employment discrimination against pregnant workers"); 124 CONG. REC. 21440
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords some 41 percent of this Nation's labor force some
greater degree of protection and security without fear of reprisal due to their decision to bear chil-
dren"); id. at 21442 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill "would . . . put an end to an unrealistic and
unfair system that forces women to choose between family and career--clearly a function of sex bias
in the law"); id. at 36818 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (the "bill represents only basic fairness for women
employees"); id. at 38574 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (Subcommittee "learned of the many instances
of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we learned of the hardships this discrimination
brought to women and their families")).
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ences between the genders; (2) to avoid accentuating the burden of
childbirth naturally imposed on the mother by preventing employers
from contributing to the economic and personal hardships that can ac-
company a decision to have a family; (3) to allow for greater freedom of
choice; and (4) to spread the burden of childbearing across the entire
work force.
It appears that, at the very least, Congress was beginning to recog-
nize an equality of respect for gender differences. The courts, however,
did not implement an equality of respect for gender differences approach
in applying the PDA. Instead, the courts tended to adhere to a strict
equality approach. For example, in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC,4 9 the Supreme Court ruled that if an employer's
health care package provided certain maternity benefits to its female em-
ployees, it must also provide the same benefits to spouses and dependents
of its male employees. Applying the strict equality of respect model leads
to the ironic and socially undesirable result that a gender-neutral law
denying benefits both to pregnant women and other similarly situated
employees would not violate the PDA.5"
B. Employer Defenses to Claims of Discrimination-A Prelude to
Protective Legislation
Underlying any pregnancy discrimination case is one of two theories
of discrimination: disparate impact or discriminatory intent. Under a
disparate impact test, a plaintiff must show that she has been adversely
affected in comparison to a similarly situated male. Employers may de-
fend themselves against such charges by using either the business neces-
sity defense (BND),5' available to rebut a disparate impact challenge, or
the bona fide occupational qualification defense (BFOQ),52 envoked to
refute a claim of intentional discrimination. If the employer is successful
in establishing either defense, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
49. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
50. See Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (upholding a
Missouri statute denying benefits to pregnant women and other similarly situated workers).
51. The BND was first introduced by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohib-
ited.") (dictum). The BND has no basis in Title VII, but has evolved primarily from Griggs "as a
defense to claims that facially neutral employment practices have discriminatory effects." Harriss v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 674 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. The BFOQ provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of
(his/her] ... sex ... in those certain instances where.., sex ... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business ....
Title VII, sec. 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). "The BFOQ is applicable to employment prac-
tices that purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex." Harriss, 649 F.2d at 674.
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prove that the employer's actions were not for a legitimate business pur-
pose,5 3 but were in fact a pretext for discrimination. 54 Under a discrimi-
natory intent theory, the employer can defeat the prima facie case by
establishing that the challenged employment policy serves a BFOQ and
that the intent to discriminate was not the sole purpose in effectuating
the policy. The United States' courts of appeals are in disagreement as to
what constitutes a legitimate business purpose and in how to discern
when such a purpose is really a guise for gender discrimination. 55
It is unclear whether the courts are using a strict equality or a spe-
cial woman approach in interpreting employer defenses to claims of vio-
lation of the PDA under either theory of discrimination. For example,
under the discriminatory intent theory posed in Harriss v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.,56 the court found that although the airline's
mandatory maternity policy may serve the legitimate business purpose of
concern for passenger safety, the policy was really a pretext for gender
discrimination because of the tandem policy of the employer to deny sen-
iority accrual while the woman was on this mandatory maternity leave.
In this case, the court was less concerned with the special female problem
of pregnancy and more concerned with the equal treatment of women
and men with respect to seniority accrual. Under a disparate impact the-
ory of discrimination, however, the courts may be trying to accommo-
date special differences between men and women.
53. BFOQ places a higher burden of proof on the employer than does a mere "legitimate busi-
ness purpose" standard. First, whereas a legitimate business purpose entails proof of relationship to
job performance, BFOQ creates a higher standard. See New York City Transit Auth'y v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979). Second, the business purpose standard may entail an improper or mixed mo-
tive. In contrast, the BFOQ requires proof of good faith.
54. See, e.g., Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1983).
55. See, e.g., Tamini v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (policy requiring
female workers to wear makeup served no legitimate business purpose, and was a pretext used to fire
a pregnant worker); Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 780 F.2d 987 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (policy
which set three month cap on maternity leaves but no cap for general illness leaves was not justified
by a legitimate business purpose and belies a pretext for discriminating against pregnant workers);
Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d at 1006 (failure to hire pregnant woman who
was the "best qualified candidate for the position" of staff attorney was not a pretext for sex discrimi-
nation because the decision served the legitimate business purpose that it is "bad business practice to
hire an employee who planned to take a leave of absence within a few months of beginning
work .. "); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (although airline's
mandatory maternity leave policy during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy does not serve a
legitimate business purpose, the airline's mandatory maternity leave policy after the thirteenth week
does serve the legitimate business purpose of maintaining passenger safety); Harriss v. Pan American
World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (airline's mandatory maternity leave policy upon dis-
covery of pregnancy serves a legitimate business purpose; however, airline's policies of mandatory
leave to continue after childbirth and denial of the accrual of seniority during maternity leave is
discriminatory and does not serve a legitimate business purpose).
56. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
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C. Protective Legislation
While American courts are generally utilizing a strict equality ap-
proach to solving pregnancy discrimination problems, they are also ap-
plying the special woman model in their analysis. Nowhere in American
pregnancy law cases is this effort more clear than in the very controver-
sial areas of mandatory maternity leave and state protective laws57 for
pregnant working women.58
Prior to the enactment of the PDA, the courts refused to hold that
mandatory maternity leave laws violated Title VII on gender discrimina-
tion grounds.59 Subsequent to the enactment of the PDA, employers
used the legitimate business defense, the BFOQ, and the BND defenses
against claims of another pregnancy-related area of discrimination, pro-
tection of the unborn fetus.6°
Until recently, the courts generally had held that they would strike
down claims of sex discrimination if the employer could show that its
purpose was to protect the unborn fetus and not to discriminate against
the pregnant worker. 6 ' The leading case on fetal protection in the work-
place is Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital.62  In Hayes, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the hospital's policy to fire pregnant working women
exposed to toxic hazards in the work environment was facially discrimi-
natory.6 The court held that if the employer could establish a BFOQ,
then the employer could rebut the finding of discrimination.'
57. State protective laws are state statutes that make maternity leave mandatory under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor and Industry, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont.
1984) (state court upholding maternity leave statute because state has interest in protecting pregnant
women).
58. "Historically, an effective means for employers, legislatures, and courts to limit the equal
employment opportunities of women was to restrict their employment out of a professed concern for
the health of women and their offspring." Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1545
(1 th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). See also, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
59. See supra note 46.
60. For a history of Title VII's relationship to pregnancy discrimination and fetal protection
policies, see generally Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981).
61. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989), rev'd -U.S.--(1991), 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1984) ("We hold that when a policy designed to protect
employee offspring from workplace hazards proves facially discriminatory, there is, in effect, no
defense, unless the employer shows a direct relationship between the policy and the actual ability of a
pregnant or fertile female to perform her job"); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
For a pre-PDA decision, see Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (in firing
a pregnant X-ray technician, the hospital failed to utilize a less discriminatory alternative such as
leave of absence).
62. 726 F.2d 1548.
63. Id. at 1550.
64. "Under traditional analysis, the BFOQ defense is available only when the employer can
show that the excluded class is unable to perform the duties that constitute the essence of the job,
duties that Title VII defines as 'necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or
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In a later case, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,65 the
Seventh Circuit used the Hayes framework to uphold a fetal protection
policy. The court found that the employer's fetal protection policy pre-
cluding all fertile women from working in high lead exposure positions
was facially discriminatory. However, the court subsequently held that
such a policy is justifiable under both a BND and a BFOQ defense.66
Underlying the Seventh Circuit's analysis is a special woman theory, that
men and women are very different and therefore, women must be
protected.67
In a related case, a California state court held that the same policy
of the same corporation was not justifiable under either a BND or a
BFOQ defense. 68 The court held that the fetal protection program dis-
criminated not on the basis of objective gender differences but on the
basis of "unfounded, unscientific stereotypic notions of women. "69
While the fact that women are biologically capable of becoming pregnant
is concededly a difference between men and women, such a fact was not
the basis of the company's discriminatory policy. "The Company's pol-
icy is to exclude women, not because they are pregnant, but because they
are fertile.",70 Underlying the California state court's decision is a strict
equality analysis that both fertile men and women stand in precisely the
same position.
D. American Parental Care Laws-A Brief Overview
Parental care policies are generally enacted, if at all, under state or
local law. Most policies grant either paid or unpaid parental care leave
and benefits. Only five states, however, guarantee unpaid maternity leave
enterprise.'" Id. at 1549 (citations omitted). The court concludes that the hospital in this case has
failed to rebut the presumption and has failed to consider less discriminatory alternatives.
65. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd -
U.S.-(1991), 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991).
66. The court held that fetal protection policies can be justified with a BND without regard to
the BFOQ defense. The court further noted that it believed that the employer, under these facts,
could justify its policy under either defense.
67. The recent reversal of Johnson Controls indicates a willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to reject its more protectionist policies of the recent past and to revive the equal treatment
model in the context of fetal protection policies. -U.S.--(1991), 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1991). But see White, J., concurring (arguing that there may still be some room for a BND).
68. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 517, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990).
69. These assumptions include: (1) women cannot govern their own sexuality; (2) all unmar-
ried, fertile women are involved or will become involved in a sexual relationship; (3) this relationship
will be with a fertile man; (4) properly informed, fertile women cannot properly weigh the chances of
unexpected pregnancy against potential fetal hazard. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 177.
70. Id. (footnote omitted). According to the court, "until a fertile woman becomes pregnant,
she stands in precisely the same position as a fertile man ... [T]he danger to the unborn offspring is
... identical." Id.
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by statute.71 Twelve other states guarantee unpaid maternity leave by
regulation or pursuant to antidiscrimination statutes.72 Because these
laws are enacted by each state individually, there is very little uniformity
in the laws. For example, whereas some maternity policies define the
duration of leave by what is defined to be the period of actual "disabil-
ity," other state policies presume a period of "disability" and then im-
pose a maximum period of leave or a "reasonable leave" standard.73
Some states have limited the leave to what is termed the childbirth-re-
lated disability as opposed to the pregnancy-related disability.74 State
policies also differ as to who is covered by the policies.75
There are several issues that must be resolved in any parental care
scheme. For example, is the leave mandatory or discretionary? Is the
leave paid or unpaid? What period of time does the leave cover? Does
the leave cover only pregnancy-related disability or does it include imme-
diate childrearing responsibilities? Are child care facilities provided? If
so, who pays for such facilities? In the United States, the answers to
these questions vary not only from state to state, but from employer to
employer as well. Examination of these issues is covered in section IV.
For now, it is important to note that if pregnancy and parental care leave
is unpaid, it is of limited value. By placing the burden of child care costs
on the employee, those most in need of assistance will be unable to afford
assistance.
III. ORGANIZATION OF MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES IN EUROPE
A. Origins of Maternity Leave Under Community Law76
1. Overview
The European Community77 is an ever-evolving, complex economic,
71. See Dowd, supra note 28, at 720-31.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 721.
74. For example, Massachusetts limits maternity leave to childbirth-related disability. MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986). Dowd, supra note 28, at
726 n.119.
75. For example, some states which do not generally mandate maternity leave, may require
maternity leave for its teachers and/or state employees. See Dowd, supra note 28, at 721 (citing IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-6.1-6-4 (Burns 1985) (mandatory childbirth leave up to one year for public school
teachers); N.Y. CIV.SERV. LAW RuLES & REGS. § 22.1(a) (McKinney 1983) (unpaid pregnancy-
related leave up to two years for civil service employees); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-702, -705
(1983) (unpaid maternity and adoption leave for up to one year for teachers)).
76. "Community Law" refers to primary and secondary law which is derived from several
treaties defining the law in the European Community. Primary law is the Treaty of Rome itself and
secondary law includes regulations, directives, opinions and recommendations derived from the
Treaty of Rome. In contrast, "national law" refers to law whose source lies in an individual member
state of the European Community, such as France, Italy, or the Federal Republic of Germany.
77. Hereinafter, the "EC." When referring specifically to the European Economic Community,
hereinafter, the "EEC." Although there are technically three communities (European Economic
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social, and legal system uniting its several member states.78
2. The Governmental Structure of the European
Economic Community
The European Economic Community (EEC) imposes a suprana-
tional structure upon its several member states loosely analogous to the
American federal structure. Like the American system, the EEC com-
prises three branches of government: legislative,79  executive,8 0  and
judicial.8
The EEC Treaty (Treaty), like the United States Constitution,
grants, defines, and limits the powers of each branch. The power granted
to the Council and the Commission is exercised through "legal acts," the
form and substance of which are defined in article 189.82
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Commis-
sion), in 1965 the member states agreed to "merge" the three communities into a single legal entity
thereby establishing a single Council of European Communities and a single Commission of Euro-
pean Communities in place of the three branches duplicated in each community. This merger was
formally executed by the Merger Treaty in 1967. Merger Treaty, 1967 J.O. COMM. EUR. 152/2, 4
I.L.M. 776 (1965). Today, the ECSC, EURATOM, and EEC theoretically remain three separate
legal communities; for all practical purposes, however, the three communities are merged and are
commonly known as the European Community.
78. The original six member states include Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Subsequent member states include Great Britain (1973),
Ireland (1973), Denmark (1973), Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986).
The development of the EEC can be traced back to the end of World War I. From 1945
through 1991, a pattern of increasing social, economic and political cooperation emerges among the
Western European nations. Post World War II Western European cooperation enabled the develop-
merit of the beginnings of Western European social, political and economic integration which began
in earnest in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community.
According to Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome: "The Community shall have as its task, by establish-
ing a common market ... to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities ... an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
the States belonging to it." For these purposes, the Community shall create "a European Social
Fund in order to improve employment opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of
their standard of living." Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4. as amended by the Single
European Act, art. 3(h), O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987), corrected in O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 304) 46 (1987); 25 I.L.M. 503 (1987) (hereinafter the "Treaty").
79. It is misleading to state that the EEC has only three branches of government. Unlike the
United States which has one bicameral legislative branch, the EEC has two separate legislative bod-
ies: the Council of Ministers (the true legislative body) and the European Parliament. Moreover, the
Community legislative process is different from the American legislative process. Under the Ameri-
can system, either the House or the Senate introduces legislation; both houses must ratify the bill
which is then sent to the President for his/her signature. Under the EEC, the Commission has the
power of initiating legislation; the European Parliament must be consulted and the Council must
enact the legislation. EEC Treaty, art. 149, as amended by the Single European Act, 1986, art. 7
(effective July 1, 1987). The European Parliament's role in the legislative process of the European
Community is so slight that this institution is not a true legislative body. The European Parliament
serves more of a political function than a legislative function.
80. The EEC executive branch is known as the Commission.
81. The EEC judicial branch is known as the European Court of Justice (the Court). The
Court is comprised of thirteen judges, one from each member state with one member state having
two judges. The judges sit for a term of six years.
82. "In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in accordance with
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Under article 189 of the Treaty, the Council and the Commission
have five specific grants of power: to make regulations, issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations, and deliver opinions.8 3 The
Council's and the Commission's power to make regulations signifies au-
thority to initiate a legal act that may generally apply throughout the
EC, address either a specific member state or a private individual,14 and
that may be directly applicable85 and binding in its entirety.86 Because
regulations are binding in their entirety, there is no transformation into
national law87 by the member states; each individual member state is re-
sponsible for enforcing these regulations within the confines of its state.88
The Council and the Commission can also issue directives. 89 Direc-
the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommenda-
tions or deliver opinions." EEC Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, para. 1.
83. Id.
84. Under the EC, a private individual is defined in a similar way as a person is defined under
American law: both include legal entities. Conf&l6ration Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et
Lgumes and Others v. Council ("Grapes"), 8 Recueil 901 (1963), [1963] Common Mkt. L.R. 160
(Consolidated Cases 16-17/62, 19-22/62).
85. The principle of "direct applicability" and "direct effects" is very important to Community
law. To be directly applicable, means that the law is "capable of forming the basis of rights and
obligations enforceable by individuals before their national courts." J. STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON
EEC LAW 18 (1988). See generally Dashwood, The Principle of Direct Effect in European Commu-
nity Law, 16 J. COMM. MKT. ST. 229 (1978); Easson, Can Directive Impose Obligations on Individu-
als?, 4 EUR. L. REV. 67 (1979); Easson, The "Direct Effect" of EEC Directives, 28 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 319 (1978). A law has "direct effects" when it is "capable of application by national courts at
the suit of individuals." J. STEINER, supra, at 18 (emphasis in the original). See, e.g., Van Gend &
Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] Common Mkt. L.R. 105
(holding that EEC Treaty article 12 is directly applicable and gives nationals rights that can be
enforced against national legislation); Firma Alfons Lutticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, 12
Recueil 293 (1966), [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. 674, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), 1 8045 (holding
that EEC Treaty article 95 is directly applicable). "If a provision of EEC law is directly effective,
domestic courts must not only apply it, but, following the principle of primacy of EEC law... must
do so in priority over any conflicting provisions of national law." J. STEINER, supra, at 19. On the
supremacy of Community law over national law, see, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (Simmenthal II), [1978] E.C.R. 629 ("A national court which is called upon,
within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full
effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of
national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the [national] court to
request or await the prior setting aside of [such national] provisions by legislative or other constitu-
tional means.").
86. "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States." EEC Treaty, art. 189, para. 2.
87. See supra note 76 (defining "national law.").
88. Regulations are "directly applicable." See, e.g., Zerbone v. Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato, [1978] E.C.R. 99. Ifa member state does not comply with a regulation, the Commission
can bring the individual member state before the Court of Justice to force compliance.
In some cases, a private party can institute a suit against a member state for its failure to
implement a regulation insofar as the citizen has standing. The party must show that the regulation
at issue is of "direct and individual concern" to her/him. In other words, unlike the United States,
there is no such thing as a class action suit in the EC. See, e.g., Grapes, 8 Recueil 901 (1963), [1963]
Common Mkt. L.R. 160 (Consolidated Cases 16-17/62, 19-22/62).
89. "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."
EEC Treaty, art. 189, para. 3.
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tives are addressed to the member states, not to individuals, and are bind-
ing as to their result."a Because a directive is binding on the member
state only as to result and not as to form, the member state must trans-
form the directive into national law. Consequently, the directive creates
a two-step legal process. It imposes a duty on the member state to
change its domestic law; then, the member state must enact legislation
that produces the result required by the directive."'
If a member state does not comply with a directive, any legal person
with standing can institute a suit against the delinquent member state
before the Court of Justice.92 If the Court of Justice finds that the mem-
ber state has failed to comply with the directive, "the State shall be re-
quired to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of
the Court of Justice."
9 3
In addition to making regulations and issuing directives, the Council
and the Commission can also take decisions and make recommendations
and opinions.94  The Treaty also provides mechanisms by which the
Council's and Commission's actions are enforced.
3. Labor Law Under the EC
Articles 117 to 119 of the Treaty of Rome establish labor policy
under primary Community law. Article 117 lays down the basic objec-
tives of the Community in the area of social legislation. Article 118 em-
powers the Commission to act in the area of labor law. Finally, article
119 creates an equal pay for comparable work and an antidiscrimination
standard.
90. Id.
91. There is disagreement whether a directive has direct effect, or whether rights are not cre-
ated until the member state has issued the directive. See, e.g., Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innen-
stadt, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982] Common Mkt. L.R. 499 (holding that "wherever the provisions of a
directive appear... to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence
of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any na-
tional provision which is incompatible with the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights
which individuals are able to assert against the State."); Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.C.R.
1337, [1975] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. I (holding that Directive 64/221 is directly applicable and con-
fers rights on individuals that are enforceable in the courts of a member state); Franz Grad v.
Finanzamt, [1970] E.C.R. 825, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. I (first case to give direct effect to a
directive).
92. EEC Treaty, arts. 169 & 175, para. 3. See also EEC Treaty, art. 170 which permits a mem-
ber state to bring suit against another member state for failure to comply with Community law. This
proceeding is very rare, however. See also article 177 whereby a national court can bring a specific
question to the European Court of Justice known as a preliminary ruling. According to this method,
the individual may bring suit in his/her national court. If a question of EC law is at issue, the
national court may refer the question to the European Court of Justice. If the national court is a
court of last resort, the national court must refer the question to the European Court of Justice.
93. EEC Treaty, art. 171.
94. EEC Treaty, art. 189, para. 1. In-depth discussion of decisions, recommendations and
opinions are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Under the authority granted by the Treaty of Rome, the Commis-
sion has handed down several regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations, and opinions, two of which, Directives 76/2079" and 75/
117,96 are pertinent to maternity leave policy and this study. These di-
rectives have been transformed into national law.
B. Maternity Leave Policies Transformed into National Law
1. Implementation of Article 119: The Social Action
Programme of 1974, Directives 75/117, and 76/207
The European Community made its first statement of social policy
in the Social Action Programme of 1974.9 7 The Programme addressed,
in part, the problems of gender discrimination within the Community
calling for equal treatment in the workplace between men and women.98
Soon after the Council's resolution concerning a social action program,
the Council issued two directives, 76/20799 and 75/117, °° and other la-
bor law measures' ° ' concerning the question of equality of treatment be-
tween the sexes. The questions of the direct applicability and scope of
the effects of article 119 and of Directive 75/117 were raised before the
European Court of Justice. On April 8, 1976, the Court of Justice held
that article 119 was directly applicable and has been since 1962;'12 na-
tional courts must ensure and protect rights granted under article 119;103
although Directive 75/117, in effect, implements article 119, the article
95. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
96. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
97. Docksey, The European Community and the Promotion of Equality, in WOMEN, EMPLOY-
MENT AND EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW (C. McCrudden ed. 1987). "The Commission regularly sets
out its policies and priorities in communications to the Council known as 'Action Programmes.'
They are used to determine and publicise the Commission's priorities for action over a specific period
and to demand, in the form of a draft Council Resolution, a political commitment from the Council
to support the Commission's objectives.... At the end of a Programme, there is an evaluation of
progress achieved and the need for further action." Id. at n.i.
98. Id. at I.
99. "The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member State the principle of
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment .... Directive 76/207, art. 1,
para. 1.
100. Directive 75/117 specifies that the principle of equal pay for men and women, as outlined in
article 119 of the Treaty, "means, for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed,
the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of
remuneration." Directive 75/117, art. 1, para. 1. The Directive further requires member states to
abolish discrimination in violation of this principle. Id. at art. 3.
101. See, e.g., Directives 79/7/E.E.C. and 86/378/E.E.C. regarding social security benefits, and
Directive 86/613/E.E.C. regarding equal treatment between men and women in certain occupations.
102. "The application of Article 119 was to have been fully secured by the original Member
States as from I January 1962 . . . and by the new Member States as from I January 1973.
Defrenne v. Sabena, (1976] E.C.R. 455, 482, [1976] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 98.
103. "The principle that men and women should receive equal pay, which is laid down in Article
119, may be relied on before the national courts. These courts have a duty to ensure the protection
of the rights that provision vests in individuals .... Defrenne v. Sabena, [1978] E.C.R. 1365 (citing
Defrenne v. Sabena, (1976] E.C.R. 455, 456).
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still has direct effects; t° the courts will not recognize these effects except
as to present and future proceedings regarding article 119.105
The European Council issued Directive 76/207 implementing the
principle of equal treatment between the sexes as espoused under article
119 of the Treaty. This directive, in pertinent part, recognizes the legiti-
macy of protecting the pregnant working woman 0 6 and has been inter-
preted as protecting certain aspects of the pregnant working woman's
needs and/or perceived needs. 107
In accordance with Directive 76/207, the member states have en-
acted national law on "maternity policy" or retained national law if the
national government believed that existing national law was in conform-
ity with the directive. Needless to say, there is considerable variety
among the national laws of the member states, despite the policy and
desire for harmonization.
2. Directive 76/207 and Its Effect on Maternity Leave in the
Federal Republic of Germany
Under national law in the Federal Republic of Germany, a pregnant
working woman must take a paid leave of absence for six weeks prior to
childbirth and then for the first eight weeks after childbirth.' °8 This is
known as the "protected period."'" Payments, or "maternity benefits,"
given out during this time are paid in part by the woman's health insur-
ance company and in part by the woman's employer."1 Upon comple-
tion of the mother's leave of absence, she is guaranteed a right to return
104. "Council Directive No. 75/117 does not prejudice the direct effect of Article 119.
Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] E.C.R. at 482.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 99.
107. [I]t is legitimate to ensure the protection of a woman's biological condition during
pregnancy and thereafter until such time as her physiological and mental functions have
returned to normal after childbirth .... [I]t is legitimate to protect the special relationship
between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth,
by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would
result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.
Hofmann v. Ersatzkasse, [1984] E.C.R. 3047, 3075, [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 242.
108. An Act to institute an entitlement to maternity leave of June 25. 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil I [hereinafter BGBI.I] 797 § 8(a), amending the Maternity Protection Act of January 24, 1952
[hereinafter, Mutterschutzgesetz], last consolidated at (1968) BGBlI.I 315, I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SE-
RIES, Ger.F.R. 1 (1979) (English trans.). Maternity leave is mandatory in the case where the
mother's -'life or health or the life or health of her child would be endangered by her continuing
employment." (1979) BGBI.I 797 § 8(a). The period of mandatory postnatal leave of absence is
"extended to 12 weeks in the case of premature and multiple births." Mutterschutzgesetz, § 6, para.
1. Moreover, any mother may not be employed after this 8-12 week period unless her health per-
mits. In the case of mandatory maternity leave, the woman is guaranteed full payment of remunera-
tion provided in part by insurance and the remainder by the employer. Id. at § 11.
109. Mutterschutzgesetz, § 6, para. 1, is that part of the statute that is particularly referred to as
the "protected period."
110. (1979) BGBI.I 797, § 13, para. 1; see also Reichsversicherungsordnung, Social Insurance
Act, § 200, para. 4.
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to work under the same terms and conditions of employment as prior to
her leave of absence. Moreover, during pregnancy leave, the employer
cannot terminate the working mother."' This national law was
amended in 1975, enabling mothers to extend their maternity leave to six
months after childbirth.'" 2 During this extended maternity leave, the
mother is entitled to additional maternity benefits." 3 This law was fur-
ther amended in 1979, enabling the mother to take maternity leave (Mut-
terschaftsurlaub) upon expiration of the six month pregnancy leave.
1 4
In 1983, the Mutterschaftsurlaub came before the Court of Justice
as violative of Directive 76/207.' The question presented to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Hofmann v. Barmer Erstzkasse 1 6 was what du-
ties does Directive 76/207 impose on the member states and has
Germany fulfilled its obligations under this directive.'
In Hofmann, the plaintiff-father who acknowledged paternity of an
illegitimate child claimed that he was entitled to "maternity leave" and
other "maternity" benefits under the Mutterschaftsurlaub. Hofmann
submitted a claim for maternity benefits to the appropriate sickness fund,
the Barmer Ersatzkasse, under the authority of paragraph 8a of the Mut-
terschutzgesetz. The sickness fund refused the claim on the theory that,
under paragraph 8a, only mothers were entitled to maternity leave.""
Instead, Mr. Hofmann received an unpaid leave of absence from his em-
ployer in the period between the expiration of the mother's mandatory
eight week protective leave of absence to the time that the child reached
six months. ' 9
Mr. Hofmann brought his case to the German court which referred
three questions to the Court of Justice: (1) Can rights under Council Di-
rective 76/207 be claimed by working fathers? (2) If so, are these rights
directly applicable in the member states?' 2° (3) If so, is German law com-
1 11. Mutterschutzgesetz, § 9, para. I.
112. (1979) BGBI.I 797, § 8(a), para. I.
113. Id. at § 13.
114. Id. "Throughout that leave the mother is relieved of her duties at work, and the State,
through the intermediary of the sickness fund, pays her a daily allowance not exceeding DM 25. On
the expiration of her leave she enjoys a guaranteed right to resume her employment on the same
conditions as before." Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, [1984] E.C.R. 3047, [1986] Common Mkt.
L.R. 242 (explaining the BGBI.1).
115. Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, [1984] E.C.R. 3047, [1986] Common Mkt. L.R. 242. In
Hofmann, the Landessozialgericht [Superior Social Court] of Hamburg referred the question inter-
preting articles 1, 2, and 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207 to the Court of Justice for its preliminary
ruling pursuant to EEC Treaty article 177.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Hofmann, [1984] E.C.R. at 3069.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3070.
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Articles 1, 2 and 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 1976
on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and
women ... must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may
... grant to mothers a period of maternity leave which the State en-
courages them to take by the payment of an allowance. The directive
does not impose on the Member States a requirement that they shall,
as an alternative, allow such leave to be granted to fathers, even where
the parents so decide.
Although Mr. Hofmann lost his case, in 1985, the Act of 1975 on
Pregnancy and Maternity was replaced by the Act on Payment and
Leave for Care of Children.1 23 According to this Act, both mothers and
fathers can take a leave of absence to care for their children until the
child is one year of age. Remuneration is not from the parent's em-
ployer, but from the health insurance system; payments are much less
than average net income and amount to about 600 German marks a
month. 124
3. Maternity Leave Laws in France
Under the French Labour Code, 125 a pregnant working woman has
several protections.1 26 First, a woman has a right to temporarily suspend
her contract of employment from six weeks prior to the anticipated date
of the child's birth until ten weeks after such time.' 27 Although mater-
nity leave is optional, 28 as in Germany, an employer may not hire a
woman two weeks prior to anticipated childbirth, nor six weeks after
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3077.
123. December 1985. See Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA FOR LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (I.E.L.L.), § 161 (R. Blanpain ed. supp. 70
1986).
124. Id.
125. The Law of 3 January 1984, Loi No. 84-4, -J.0. 148, Jan. 4, 1984, codified at CODE DU
TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 122-25 to L. 122-32; see I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, Fr. 1, (1981)
(English trans.). See generally Despax & Rojot, France, in 4 I.E.L.L., §§ 188-92 (R. Blanpain ed.
supp. 77 1987) [hereinafter Despax & Rojot].
126. The general law on protection of maternity under the French Labour Code provides:
No employer shall retain the fact that a woman is pregnant as a ground for refusing to
recruit her, for terminating her contract of employment during any period of probation or,
subject to section L. 122-25-1, for ordering her transfer to another job. It shall therefore be
unlawful for him to seek to obtain any information relating to her pregnancy or instruct
others to seek to obtain such information.
No woman applying for or employed in any job shall be required to reveal the fact
that she is pregnant, except where she requests to benefit from any law or regulation gov-
erning the protection of pregnant women.
C. TRAV. art. L. 122-25.
For other protections, see C. TRAV. art. L. 122-25 to L. 122-32.
127. Id. at art. L. 122-26, para. 1-4.
128. See id. See also id. at art. L. 122-28-1: "An employee shall be entitled to leave for the
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childbirth.' 29 Second, during the period of suspension (up to twenty
weeks), the employee is paid maternity allowances via social security
amounting to ninety percent of her base wage. 130 Third, there can be no
termination of the contract of employment during a woman's maternity
leave. 3' Moreover, there can be no termination of employment except
for a serious offense independent of pregnancy from the day the employer
has been notified as to the woman's condition of pregnancy until the be-
ginning of maternity leave.' 32 Fourth, any transfer during the time of
pregnancy must be to the benefit of the woman and without a pay reduc-
tion.' 33 Moreover, once the woman returns to work after childbirth, she
must be reinstated to her previous position.' 34 Fifth, parental leave, for
both the mother and the father, is available for childrearing purposes.
35
A woman who takes parental leave does not necessarily lose her senior-
ity; at the end of her period of suspension, the mother who wishes to
reenter the work force is granted priority.' 36  Furthermore, the father
can take parental leave 37 and either parent may request part-time work
in conjunction with parental leave. Part-time workers do not lose their
seniority.
38
In response to Directive 76/207, France amended the Labour Code
to conform with the principle of equal treatment. 39 This amendment
was enacted in 1983, almost five years after the expiration of the period
of conformity stipulated by the Directive.'4o Pursuant to article 169, the
Commission brought suit against France to comply with the Directive. '4'
The Commission argued that not only did France fail to comply with the
purpose of bringing up a child whenever a child is born or adopted .... " Compare Germany where
maternity leave is mandatory, and the United States where maternity leave is at best optional.
Whereas in France, if the child dies, the mother may elect to reduce her leave period, in Ger-
many, if the child dies, the mother must return to work.
129. The situation is the same for adoption. Despax & Rojot, supra note 125, at § 189. Cf.
Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that, although a
"close case," an employer's failure to hire a pregnant woman a few months before childbirth was
justifiable discrimination).
130. Despax & Rojot, supra note 125, at § 189. Unpaid maternity leave is available for up to 2
years after childbirth.
131. C. TRAy. art L. 122-25-2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at art. L. 122-25-1.
134. Id. at art. L. 122-26, para. 7.
135. See id. at art. L. 122-28-3.
136. Id. at art. L. 122-28-1.
137. Id.
138. Cf. Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (em-
ployer's denial to accrue seniority during maternity leave of full-time employees is discriminatory
and does not serve a legitimate business purpose).
139. C. TRAY. art. L. 123-1(c).
140. "Member States shall put into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
necessary in order to comply with this Directive within 30 months of its notification and shall imme-
diately inform the Commission thereof." Directive 76/207/E.E.C., Feb. 9, 1976, art. 9, para. 1.
141. Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6315, [1989] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 408.
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Directive within the specified time period, but that the French legislation
that eventually was enacted 42 conflicted with the results required by Di-
rective 76/207.143
The Court held that "the protection of women in connection with
pregnancy [under Directive 76/207] has the objective of protecting the
special relationship between a woman and her child over the period
which follows pregnancy, by preventing that relationship from being dis-
turbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultane-
ous pursuit of employment." 1 "44 However, this objective does not
promote the view advanced by the French legislation "authoris[ing] the
retention of discriminatory conditions for an indefinite period and
leav[ing] abolition to the discretion of the two sides of industry."' 45
4. Maternity Leave Laws in Italy
Italy has enacted a mandatory maternity leave policy making ma-
ternity leave compulsory from two months prior to the anticipated birth
date to three months after childbirth.'" This statutorily protected
mandatory maternity leave period is counted as actual work regarding
seniority and most other employee benefits.' 47  Moreover, during the
time of her leave, the pregnant woman is entitled to eighty percent of her
salary from social security insurance.'48 Finally, a woman cannot be dis-
missed from the beginning of pregnancy to one year after childbirth.'
49
In addition to these policies, working mothers are granted several
142. Law of 13 July 1983, Loi No. 83-635, - JOURNAL OFFICIEL [J.O.] 2176, July 14, 1983,
codified at C. TRAY. art L. 123-2.
143. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Directive provide:
"This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity.
"This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for men
and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities in
the areas referred to in Article l(l)." Directive 76/207, supra note 99.
144. Id. at art. 2(3).
145. Id. The French government argued that: (1) immediate abolition of all differences between
the sexes would be too difficult; therefore, the better method for bringing employment conditions in
line with the principle of equal treatment is through collective bargaining; and (2) article 2(4) of the
Directive allows for certain inequalities between the sexes. Commission v. France, [1989] 1 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. 408.
146. Act No. 1204, Tutela delle la voratrici madri, Rac. Uff. 4617 (Law of Dec. 30, 1971), Re-
specting the Protection of Working Mothers, I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, It. 1, (1971) (English
trans.) [hereinafter Act No. 1204]. See generally Treu, Italy, in 6 I.E.L.L. § 173 (R. Blanpain, ed.
supp. 1985).
147. Act No. 1204, art. 7, para. 3.
148. Act No. 1204, part II, § 15, paras. 1, 3.
149. Act No. 1204, part I, § 2. Compare the United States PDA (no employer may dismiss a
worker because she is pregnant without a BFOQ or a BND) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971); C. TRAY. art. L. 122-25-2, para. I (no employer may dismiss a worker because she
is pregnant unless he can show that termination is unconnected with pregnancy).
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other protections.o The working mother has the option to take up to an
additional six months leave of absence after the mandatory maternity
leave,1"' and has a right to leave work if the child takes ill.'1 2 In 1977,
these rights were extended to cover adoptive mothers."' This act also
introduced limited paternity leave.' 54
In 1982, "[tlhe Commission, being of the opinion that Italian Law
No. 903 transposed the provisions of articles 5 and 6 of the directive into
Italian law to an extent and in a manner not in conformity with the spirit
and the letter of the Community instrument"'" brought an article 169
proceeding against Italy for failure to comply with Directive 76/207.156
The Court of Justice, in pertinent part, held that neither article 5 nor
article 6 had been adequately transformed into Italian national law.
157
Although the Commission argued that, in particular, article 6 of Law
No. 903 discriminates against workers with respect to adoption leave, the
Court held that within the meaning of the directive there was no
discrimination.
150. See, e.g., Act No. 903, Pariti di trattamento tra uomini e donne in materia di lavoro, Rac.
Uff. 2074 (Law of Dec. 9, 1977), Respecting the equality of treatment as between men and women in
questions of employment, I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, It. 1 (1977) (English trans.) [hereinafter Act
No. 903]; See also Act. No. 1204.
151. Act No. 1204, § 7, para. 1.
152. Id. at para. 2.
153. "A female worker who has adopted a child or who has been granted the custody of a child
prior to its adoption . .. may avail themselves of the compulsory absence from work [of Act No.
1204, § 4] and of the corresponding remuneration, for the first three months following the child's
becoming a member of the family." Act No. 903, § 6, para. 1.
154. "The right to be absent from work and the right to remuneration respectively provided for
[in Act No. 1204, § 7 and § 15, para. 2] shall also be enjoyed by a male worker who is an adoptive
father or has the father's custody of a child.., in substitution for the working mother or where the
children are in the father's sole custody." Id. at § 7, para. 1. Compare France, where paternity leave
is granted on the same level as maternity leave.
155. Commission v. Italian Republic, [1983] E.C.R. 3273, 3277.
156. Id. at 3273. The Commission brought an action against the Italian government on the
theory that Act No. 903 failed to comply with articles 5, 6, and 9 of Directive 76/207. Articles 5
and 6 provide that:
(1) Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions, in-
cluding the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaran-
teed the same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex.
(2) To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the principle of
equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are included in
collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, internal rules of un-
dertakings or in rules governing the independent occupations and professions
shall be ... null and void or may be amended .... art. 5.
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are
necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply to
them the principle of equal treatment . . . to pursue their claims by judicial process after
possible recourse to other competent authorities. art. 6.
157. Id.
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Maternity leave laws, like many other bodies of law, reflect underly-
ing societal values and policy decisions of the particular society in the
aggregate. What values and decisions do current maternity leave policies
reflect and which values should these policies reflect? There are several
policies that maternity laws can encourage, including efficient allocation
of the burden of childbirth and childrearing, equitable distribution of
these burdens, and freedom of individual choice. Examination of a soci-
ety's maternity laws reveals the choices a society makes as well as the
values underlying those choices. Thus, maternity leave laws can have
both a rational and irrational component to them. The rational compo-
nent is reflected in the society's willingness to efficiently distribute the
burdens of childrearing while the irrational component is reflected, in
part, by those policies that use traditional concepts of gender roles in
enacting maternity policies.
An informative comparative analysis should reveal the weaknesses
and strengths in each system at issue, aiming to shed light on how to
better deal with selecting a legal policy that encourages the desired social
policy. 15 8 In the cases of both the United States and the European Com-
munity, the question is the same: which legal policies will equitably pro-
mote a couple's freedom of choice, efficiently and equitably distribute the
burdens of childbirth and childrearing, and maximize efficiency on the
international market? At some points, these goals converge. At other
points, these goals become mutually exclusive. Where the burdens of
maternity and parental care leave are placed on the employer, there are
times when it becomes more efficient to discriminate against a woman.
The question is, at what point is a society willing to refuse to tolerate
economically rational and irrational discrimination?' 59
An analysis of the different maternity leave laws in light of several
values is useful in better understanding the importance of and the extent
to which each society promotes these values. This section of the paper is
divided into two subsections: distribution of the burden of child care and
distribution of the burden of pregnancy-related disability. Each of these
subsections will examine childrearing or childbirth-related burdens in
light of efficiency, equity, and freedom of individual choice.
158. By "desired social policy," I mean social policy that a specific society wants reflected in or
promoted by its laws. In an analysis of social policy, it is important to ask whether the society's
desired social policy actually has been enacted into law, whether the law actually promotes the
stipulated policy, and whether the stipulated policy is really desirable.
159. For example, although there is economically rational racial discrimination in the United
States, such discrimination is never tolerated. See Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982).
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A. Distribution of the Burden of Child Care
There are potentially three sources of child care: the employee, the
employer, and the government. Often, the choice of where the burden
falls is decided by the society's legislative body. For example, the legisla-
ture can enact a body of insurance laws or laws mandating a worktime
day care system. Such a legislative body has made the policy choice to
distribute the costs throughout the society. The legislative body may also
subsidize private employers who choose to provide workplace day
care."6° In this case, the legislature has chosen to encourage the em-
ployer to initiate the program through a series of tax credits and incen-
tives. Such a system, however, does not place all the burden on the
employer. Instead, the burden is initially on the employer to create the
private day care system. This burden is shifted to the government in the
form of a tax credit. In effect, under a government subsidized program,
the ultimate burden of child care is passed on to society.
Finally, the legislature may choose not to act, in which case the bur-
den falls on the employee to provide his or her own day care. To place
the burden of child care on the employee is ultimately to place the bur-
den on the working mother or on the companion or spouse of the work-
ing father.
1. Employee's Obligation-the American Way
The United States government has enacted several laws in an at-
tempt to curtail the burden of child care that our nation places on wo-
men. These laws provide for government subsidy of child care through a
system of tax credits. Currently, the law provides for a personal income
tax credit to individuals. The credit is equivalent to thirty percent of the
qualified child care expenses related to employment with a cap of $2,400
for the taxpayer with one dependent child, and $4,800 for the taxpayer
with two or more dependent children.16' There are several limitations on
this program including a reduction in the credit percentage down to 20
percent as family income rises above $10,000.162 These programs are
highly inadequate and are presently undergoing transformation by
Congress. 163
160. See U.S.-Backed Panel's Parental-Leave Plan Sparks Outcry, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1990, at
BI, col. 4 (calling for a government-mandated parental leave law). Compare the several European
systems which have already largely implemented mandatory government benefits.
161. Hoerner, Credits Where Credits Are Due: Child Care and Family Dynamics, 45 TAx NOTES
143, 144 (1989)[hereinafter Hoerner, Credits].
162. Id. In addition, eligibility of the tax credit goes solely to the custodial parent. There is also
an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) available to families with dependent children which grants
several tax credits indexed for inflation.
163. See discussion infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
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2. Employer's Obligation: Privately Supported Initiatives in the
United States
Another method of distributing the burden of child care is to place a
legal duty on the employer to provide adequate day care for its employ-
ees. ' Placing the burden of child care onto the employer allows free-
dom of individual choice. The couple can decide whether to utilize the
employer-sponsored day care facility, find an alternative source of day
care, or designate either the mother or the father to accept primary child
care responsibilities by staying home. However, if the employer is forced
to pay for the child care facilities and/or parental care benefits, this gives
the employer an additional argument to discriminate rationally against
women. Assuming the employer will engage in stereotyping, and assum-
ing the employer is forced to pay for child care and parental care benefits,
the employer may tend to discriminate against (refuse to hire) women of
childbearing years. For these reasons, the employer is not well-suited to
bear the entire burden of a national family care policy.
In 1978, only 110 employers in the United States sponsored or pro-
vided child care for their employees. Among these employers were some
government agencies and hospitals. In 1982, child care became a nontax-
able employee benefit and 600 employers provided child care services. In
1984, this number rose to 2,500, "as the private sector moved to take up
the slack after President Reagan cut social services by 20 percent." By
1989, this number had risen to 4,200 employers who provide some form
of child care. 16-
As businesses need to hire more working mothers, they have been
and will continue to be confronted with the problem of providing child
care in order to tap and expand the labor market of working mothers.
This can be accomplished by providing several day care packages to em-
ployees, especially since such benefits are not taxable.
The more progressive programs need not be limited to day care fa-
cilities on the business premises. These programs could take the form of
emergency child care facilities on the business premises, 66 child care re-
ferral services, employer reimbursements for private day care, guaran-
teed parental leaves of absence, flexible work schedules, and allowances
for personal days when the child is ill. The federal government could
164. See generally Comment, Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title VII. Toward an Em-
ployer's Duty to Accommodate Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
89 (1986) (authored by Catherine Fisk).
165. Employer Day Care, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 21, 1989, at 6, col. I.
166. Id. Several employers have instituted emergency child care facilities on the business prem-
ises. For example, Cravath, Swaine & Moore provides emergency day care facilities at its firm.
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promote such a system by granting tax credits to employers who sponsor
day care and provide parental benefits.
3. Society's Obligation: Government Mandated and Government
Sponsored Child Care
There is a great deal of popular unrest sparked by the belief that
current child care programs in the United States are unregulated and
often dangerous. 67 The question the federal government recently has
been asking itself is: "Is there a shortage of childcare that justifies Fed-
eral intervention in the child-care market?" '68 Government studies sug-
gest that if the current trend continues, the percentage of "preschool
children with mothers in the labor market will rise from about half in
1985 to about two-thirds by 1995."169 Sandra Hofferth of the Urban In-
stitute believes that these trends will continue, in part, because of "new
welfare rules requiring employment, schooling, or training for all
mothers of children three or older." 7 ° Moreover, Hofferth stresses that
quality, not cost, of day care is the greatest source of stress for parents
interested in utilizing day care facilities.' 7 '
In addition to this distress over the day care situation, radical
changes in the American family structure over the past two decades have
led to increased need to relieve women of the dual burdens of full-time
outside work together with full-time in-home work.' 72 These trends in-
clude the fact that, "at every income level, most women with young chil-
dren are employed outside the home," and that "families consisting of
single women with children have become the majority of the poor."' 
7 3
Moreover, "despite the additional burdens of market labor, women's
hours of work in the home have declined very little.... Less than half of
the increase in women's hours of market labor is offset by a decrease in
hours of home labor." 1
74
Given these concerns about quality, quantity, and cost of day care,
the United States House of Representatives recently passed two child
care bills, both of which "require that the states set standards governing
167. See, e.g., Hoerner, Quality of Child Care Dips in Face of Increased Demand, 45 TAX NOTES
811, 811-12 (1989) [hereinafter Hoerner, Quality]; Beaty & Woolley, Child Molestors Need Not Ap-
ply: A History of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law and Legislative Efforts to Prevent the
Hiring ofAbusers by Child Care Agencies, 89 DICKINSON LREv. 669 (1985); L.A. Daily J., Sept. 11,
1984, at 4, col. 3. But see Employer Day Care, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 21, 1989, at 6, col. I reprinted
from N.Y. Times (showing the trend toward better day care facilities).




172. Hoerner, Credits, supra note 161, at 143.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Frank Stafford, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan).
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care providers... [and provide for] periodic inspections, [the] creation of
local child developement [sic] councils, and [the] provision of certain pa-
rental participation rights.'" 75 In addition, both bills authorize govern-
ment spending for coordinating federal child care programs as well as
expansion of Head Start and school-based child care programs.'7 6 Pres-
ently, greater child care assistance to poor families through the earned
income tax credit is being debated in Congress.
B. Distribution of the Burden of Childbirth-Related Benefits
The European systems that are the subject of this paper already
have implemented mandatory maternity leave and maternity benefits.
For example, in Germany, a woman is entitled to a mandatory period of
pregnancy leave during which time she is entitled to full payment of re-
muneration.' 7 7 German law further provides for extended maternity
leave or, in the alternative, paternity leave.1 78 In France, a woman is
entitled to both pregnancy and maternity leave during which time she is
entitled to social security benefits amounting to ninety percent of her
base wage.' 79 France also provides limited paternity leave.' 80  Finally,
Italy has instituted compulsory maternity leave during which time the
mother is entitled to social security benefits amounting to eighty percent
of her base pay. 181
In the United States, parental leave is not mandatory. Generally,
employment is at will' 82 and the pregnant working woman's or working
mother's only protections against employment termination are that an
employer cannot fire her for being pregnant'8 3 or for some reason that is
really a guise for discrimination.'8 4
This condition is aggravated by a society that legally permits ra-
tional discrimination. In the United States, this type of discrimination
175. Hoerner, House Adopts Child Care Language, 45 TAx NOTES 142, 142 (1989).
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying notes.
178. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying notes.
179. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
182. The employment-at-will doctrine is traditional common law still in force today. According
to this doctrine, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, employment is at-will and
either party may terminate the employment contract at any time. See, e.g., Payne v. The Western &
Atlantic Railroad Company, 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). Although some jurisdictions have modified the
traditional at-will rule, the rule continues to live. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (specifically refusing to modify the
at-will doctrine).
183. See, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701-18, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17, 92 Stat.
2076 (1978) (PDA). Prior to the PDA, a pregnant working woman possessed no common law or
statutory protection from employment termination. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
184. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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was approved by Congress under Title VII's bona fide occupational qual-
ification.'85 Under this defense, even if an employee proves gender dis-
crimination, it is a complete defense for the employer to show a BFOQ.
Giving an employer a complete, although limited, defense to discrimina-
tion reveals the extent to which that society is willing to tolerate discrimi-
nation. Thus, in the United States, it is statutorily permitted to
discriminate against a woman if the employer can show a BFOQ or a
BND. This defense is not available to the American employer who ra-
cially discriminates. In other words, even if an employer can show a
BFOQ or a BND for racially discriminating against an employee, (for
example, the employer's clients will not work with a nonwhite em-
ployee), our society refuses to tolerate this type of racial discrimination.
In contrast, the United States does tolerate this type of gender
discrimination.
In Germany, an employer cannot discriminate against a pregnant
working woman for any reason. 186 There is an employer defense similar
to the BFOQ or BND in France, however. Under the French Labour
Code, an employer can fire a pregnant woman if it can show that the
worker is guilty of a serious offense unrelated to her pregnancy.1
8 7
In the United States the trend may be changing. Recently, a govern-
ment sponsored panel issued a report based on a study also financed by
the federal government proposing "an expansive government-mandated
parental leave policy .... The panel recommended that employers be
required to guarantee leavetakers' jobs and continue providing health
benefits during their absence. It urged that parents ultimately get 'partial
income replacement up to six months' so more families could afford the
time off." The assumption behind the plan is that "'[t]he establishment
of strong relationships between parents and children in the early months
of life has been shown to have significant implications for children's later
development.... [T]hese relationships are more likely to develop when
parents have time and emotional energy to interact with their young chil-
dren.' ",188 Although the panel calls for gender neutral parental leave,
185. [I]t shall not be unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual,
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment
any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ
any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
Title VII, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982).
186. See supra note Ill and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
188. See U.S.-Backed Panel's Parental-Leave Plan Spark's Outcry, supra note 160.
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the article reveals that the presumption remains that child care is the
woman's burden. "The panel which also called for major changes in the
national child-care system, cited a shortage of high-quality child care for
infants. 'Some parents are forced to make choices they should not have
to make,' and young children are exposed to potentially damaging effects
of poor-quality care. Currently, 56% of women with children under age
six are in the work force."' 9
C. Stereotyping: Characterization of Maternity Laws as a Disability
Gender-related stereotypes are often encouraged by the way in
which that society chooses to characterize its maternity laws. In the
United States, for example, maternity leave statutes are often smaller
parts of disability statutes. Such a characterization serves to support and
promote the fiction that women are frail and needy of protection. Only
women give birth; this is the most obvious difference between the sexes.
If such a quality as being pregnant, a quality that only women can pos-
sess, is connected with disability and sickness, then any statute that
makes this connection serves to emphasize and promote society's belief
that women are weaker than men. Maternity statutes in some European
countries also characterize maternity as a disability. Moreover, the
stated purpose of such statutes is to "protect" the needs of the woman.
Again, such statutes serve, to a lesser extent, to promote the idea that
women are the weaker sex.
When taking maternity leave becomes mandatory, as in some Euro-
pean nations as well as in the United States under state protective laws,
promotion of gender stereotypes is further encouraged.
On the other hand, a gender-neutral disability statute that includes
maternity leave may have less of a discriminatory impact than does a
straight maternity statute. Still, a gender-neutral parental leave statute
fully enforced by the government has no discriminatory impact and no
stereotyping effect.
V. THE EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AS OPPOSED TO GUARANTEED
MATERNITY LEAVE: THE ISSUE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Directive 76/207 obligates each member state to protect the needs of
the pregnant working woman. In accordance with this Directive, each
member state has enacted maternity policies that supposedly promote
this result. Thus, each member state has some maternity policy.
In contrast, Title VII only requires that American states not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex in their maternity policies. Thus, at least
189. Id.
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theoretically, an employer need not have any maternity policy so long as
it does not terminate its employee on the basis of gender or pregnancy.
A system that does not allow for any maternity leave whatsoever
cannot serve to promote freedom of individual choice. Even if the wo-
man decides not to take time off to rear the child, some time off is neces-
sary to actually have the child. Thus, a theoretical state with no
maternity policy serves to keep women out of the labor force.
On the other hand, a law whose policy is to "protect the special
relationship between the woman and her child during the period follow-
ing pregnancy and childbirth"'" serves to promote the antiquated value
that it is the role of the woman, as caretaker, to take primary responsibil-
ity for the raising of the child. This policy becomes more pronounced
and more invidious when the above directive is transformed into national
law as mandatory maternity leave. Once maternity leave becomes
mandatory, it is no longer the woman's or the couple's choice who shall
be primary caretaker. Instead, this decision has been made and pro-
moted by the national government (i.e., Italy, Germany).
This value, freedom of individual choice, is not much better pro-
moted in the United States where although maternity leave is not
mandatory, paternity leave does not exist; and where it is available, few
men opt to take such leave. Although it is arguable that where paternity
leave is available and women still take maternity leave freedom of choice
is sustained, such choice is probably more attributable to societal expec-
tations than to personal choice. Thus, if a couple is merely giving in to
society's values as reflected and reinforced, in part, by that society's laws,
then is it not inaccurate to say that such a couple is exercising its freedom
of choice? Moreover, as the United States lacks adequate day care facili-
ties or affordable nannies to watch preschoolers, a couple who would
both like to work often cannot. Usually, it is the woman who drops out
of the work force by default. Such a system can hardly be viewed as
maximizing freedom of personal choice.
A better system might allow for adequate parental leave as well as
support adequate day care facilities. For parental leave to be adequate,
however, society must remove incentives for rational discrimination and
provide disincentives to employers who discriminate against both men
and women who decide to utilize parental leave. To prevent economi-
cally rational discrimination, society must place the burden on the indi-
viduals or institutions who are best able to bear that burden. In this case,
it is economically efficient to spread the burden across society. More-
over, such a system must guarantee that a parent cannot be terminated
190. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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during such leave of absence. Some European nations have such a sys-
tem. To some extent, the United States also promotes this idea. Neither
the United States nor Europe, however, provide disincentives to employ-
ers who discriminate against men. To provide disincentives to an em-
ployer not to discriminate against a woman on maternity leave without
the same protection for a man on parental leave, is to provide an incen-
tive for a couple to choose the woman as the primary caretaker. Thus
again, the policy behind what appears to be a system less discriminatory
toward women, in fact, is more discriminatory toward women, promotes
gender stereotypes, and discourages freedom of personal choice.
If such policies serve as a barrier for women to remain in the labor
market, then they tend to promote inequity as well as inefficiency. For
example, if a woman leaves the work force for some time to raise her
children, she has left the labor market and her human capital is less mar-
ketable now than when she left. If the societal goal is to promote families
and to have a highly skilled and efficient labor force, legislation should
provide incentives for, rather than promoting barriers to, reentry into the
labor force.'91
CONCLUSION
In writing pregnancy and parental care laws, it is important to have
a vision of the society we wish to live in. If the United States values free
choice, individuality, and equality, then this nation may not be perform-
ing at an optimal level. This is partly attributable to conflict between
these values and others such as maximizing employer profit and interna-
tional competitiveness-values embodied in legal rules and policies such
as BFOQ, BND, and unpaid maternity leave.
The choice to have employer defenses to pregnancy discrimination,
and the decision to allow profit motive to be balanced against free choice,
individuality, and equality reflect the values of those who wrote the laws.
But most importantly, these laws reflect human values, not absolute
truths. With a clear vision of the society we wish to construct, these laws
can be changed to better reflect and better shape such a society.
191. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55 (no tax break for those out of the work force for
more than five years; generally women with small children are the only members of society who fit
this category).
